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LORD READING C.J. A submission has been made to the Court by the defence that this indictment should be quashed on the ground that it discloses no offence known to the English law. Another way of putting the same proposition is that the Court should rule, according to the contention of the defence, that the Crown has failed to prove an offence in law. The prisoner is charged with that species of treason which is known as adhering to the King’s enemies. The charge in the indictment is the offence of “high treason by adhering to the King’s enemies elsewhere than in the King’s realm, to wit, in the Empire of Germany, contrary to the Treason Act,
(1) 1 East, P. C. 80.
(2) L. R. 3 H. L. 306, 318. [*122]
the advantage of elaborate arguments, by no means too elaborate, on behalf of the defence, and also on behalf of the Crown by the Attorney-General; and although this point has been discussed many times in the books and decided, according to our view, in the most recent case of treason, Rex v. Lynch (1), yet it merits careful examination by this Court.
The argument is that this Court must construe the words of the statute of 1351 and must pay no regard to any commentary that may have been made by learned authors, however distinguished, when arriving at the meaning of the words. That we must interpret the words of the statute is beyond question. That we should not be entitled to do violence to the words of the statute may, I think, also be assumed. But if the words of the statute are not clear, and if it be possible to construe the statute in two different ways, then the comments of great lawyers, masters of the common law, during the last three or four centuries cannot be allowed by this Court to pass without the greatest regard and consideration.
The words in question in the statute 25 Edw. 3 are these, paraphrasing them: “It shall be treason if a man do levy war against our Lord the King in his realm or be adherent to the King’s enemies in his realm, giving to them aid and comfort in the realm or elsewhere.” The contention is that those words “or elsewhere” govern only the words “aid and comfort in the realm” and have no application to the words “be adherent to the King’s enemies in his realm.” As the offence is that of adhering to the King’s enemies, if the words “or elsewhere” do not apply to the adhering, then the contention of the defence would be right. If, on the other hand, the Crown’s contention is correct that those words “or elsewhere” do govern the adhering to the King’s enemies, then it is plainly an offence to adhere to the King’s enemies by an act committed without the realm. In order to avoid ambiguity I would add that to constitute the offence for this purpose it is not sufficient to show that the aid and comfort have been given to enemies without the realm. The act of adherence which constitutes the charge must also have been committed without the realm for this purpose, because the whole of this indictment is based upon the offence of adhering to the King’s enemies without the realm.
(1) [1903] 1 K. B. 444. [*123]
Now I repeat what I said during the argument, that we must construe these words of this statute, now some 560 years old, without reference to commas or brackets, but merely looking to the language. The history of the law of treason in this country is certainly of importance in considering the statute of 1351. It is unnecessary at this time, and having regard to the authorities to which I shall call attention in a moment, to refer in great detail to the early law. But I have no hesitation myself in stating that if a man adhere to the King’s enemies without the realm he is committing the offence of treason; and that he is committing the offence of treason at common law, notwithstanding that the offence is committed without the realm. We have heard considerable argument to establish that the common law of England never knew a crime which was not committed within the territory of England, that is to say, in ancient times of course; and it is said the common law of England still obtains except in so far as it has been altered by statute. There is authority for the proposition which I have stated. Sir Matthew Hale in his Pleas of the Crown (1) says: “Touching the trial of foreign treason, viz., adhering to the King’s enemies, as also for compassing the King’s death without the kingdom at this day, the statutes [ sic ] of 35 Hen. 8, c. 2, hath sufficiently provided for it”; then follows a passage upon which I lay special stress: “But at common law he might have been indicted in any county of England, and especially where the offender’s lands lie, if he have any.” In support of that reference is made to a case in the fifth year of the reign of Richard II. which is to be found in Fitzherbert’s Abridgment. (2) The substance of it – I am not quoting the exact words – is that the then King’s Attorney (3) stated to the Court, and apparently, so far as one can judge from the report, without any contradiction by the Court, and so far as I know without any contradiction to be found in any book up to this very day, that that was the law, and it was adopted as the law by Sir Matthew Hale in the passage which I have read. I am prepared to concede that if the statute were unambiguous in its terms we ought to construe its language without reference to the fact that it happens to be declaratory of the common law; but it is a matter not lightly to be
(1) Vol. 1, p. 169.
(2) Fitzh. Abr. Trial, s. 54.
(3) See note (6) on p. 108, ante. [*124]
passed by that the common law before this statute was, in my opinion, as I have stated it. It has been said more than once (1) that this statute of 1351 was declaratory of the common law. There is no doubt that at that time there was great agitation amongst the subjects of the King because of the fear of the consequence of being charged with treason, which was a crime at that time so vague, or thought to be so vague, that those who might be charged with it were apprehensive of the consequences; and the result was that on petition to Parliament the statute then became law and received the assent of the King in the words to which I have referred.
Now from the year 1351 until the thirty-fifth year of the reign of Henry VIII. there is little to assist us; but in the reign of Henry VIII. a statute was passed which in my view is of importance in this connection. The statute is entitled “An Acte concerninge the triall of treasons comytted out of the Kinge Majesties domynions.” It recites – again I am paraphrasing the language – that doubts and questions had arisen as to the trial of treasons and misprisions of treasons committed abroad. It is worth noting that the doubts had not arisen as to whether the act, if committed abroad, would amount to treason, but only as to the trial. Then the statute proceeds: “Be it enacted,” &c., “that all manner of offences being alredye made or declared, or hereafter to be made or declared by any the lawes and statute of this Realme, to be treasons …. and done ppetrated or comytted or hereafter to be done ppetrate or comitted by anye pson or psons out of this Realme of Englande, shalbe from hensforth inquired of herd and determyned before the King( Justic( of his Benche for plees to be holden before himselfe,” that is the King’s Bench, and also as an alternative by commissioners where a commission is appointed. Now that statute assumes that the offence of treason can be committed without the realm; and it prescribes in respect of all such offences as have already been declared the mode of procedure, or rather the venue of the trial. The statute shows plainly that the offence existed. From that time the statute has regulated the trial of offences without the realm. It is by virtue of that statute and subsequent statutes,
(1) 3 Inst. 1, note; Sindercome’s Case (1657) 5 Cobb. St. Tr. 848; Bellew’s Case (1672) 1 Vent. 254, note; Reg. v. Smith O’Brien (1849)
which have really done nothing more than provide that the counties of London and Middlesex shall be one county for this purpose, that the jurisdiction of this Court is derived. It is because we are sitting as judges of the King’s Bench that we become the judges to try this case, for the reason that, if it is a treason committed without the realm, the venue is prescribed by this statute of Henry VIII. as of the King’s justices “where the saide Benche shall sytt and be kepte.” That statute of Henry VIII. at least shows clearly what the law was at the time it was passed, and is, to my mind, authority for this proposition, that there was the offence of treason without the realm; and further, quite consistently with the reading which the Crown wishes to give to the statute of 1351, it would apply to the offence of adhering to the King’s enemies without the realm. The doubts that have arisen from beginning to end, so far as we have been able to trace in looking through the various books to which we have had access and to which our attention has been called, are never as to the offence, but only as to the venue. This was the whole difficulty which arose, as was pointed out by learned authors, and more especially in Hawkins’s Pleas of the Crown (1), where this matter is dealt with in passages that have been read and of which I will only read one short passage now. There the learned author says “It seems to have been a great doubt before the making of the statute of 35 Hen. 8, c.
(1) Hawk. P. C., bk. 2, ch. 25, s. 48, vol. 4, p. 22 (Leach); vol. 2, p. 306 (Curwood). [*126]
of that great master of the law and also of Sir Matthew Hale, whom I have just quoted. The only observation I wish to make upon it is that the defence would say, as Mr. Sullivan pointed out, and, I think, rightly, that it does not follow that this meaning must be given to the words now under discussion because, it is said, there were other offences of treason without the realm. But equally it must be observed that the learned author suggests no exception to the general statement, and there is nothing which would support an exception being made save the interpretation of the statute contended for by the defence. I can find no justification for doubting that these learned authors meant their language to apply equally to a case of adhering to the King’s enemies without the realm as to any other kind of offence of treason without the realm.
Now I will not read again the passages in Coke’s Institutes, but they contain (1) a statement of the law which is plain in its terms and which Mr. Sullivan quite frankly stated was an authority against him, if the Court accepted it as an authority.
Then coming to later days there are passages in Mulcahy v. Reg. (2) in which Willes J., in giving to the House of Lords not only his opinion but the opinion of all the judges on the law relating to treason, adopted the construction of the words of the statute of 1351 that the offence is committed if a person be adherent to the King’s enemies in his realm or elsewhere. He leaves out the words which have given rise to this discussion, i.e., “giving them aid and comfort.” These views were adopted by the House of Lords. It is right here again to say that Mr. Sullivan pointed out, and again I say in my judgment accurately, that these observations of Willes J. were by the way; but nevertheless they were the considered opinion of the judges given to the House of Lords, and the House of Lords did not dissent from any one of the views expressed.
Then at last we come to the decision in Rex v. Lynch. (3) There the same argument was advanced by the defence that has been put forward before us, and it was persisted in and elaborately argued. The Court there came to the conclusion that the defendant’s contention was wrong, and, although it gave no judgment, the then
(1) 3 Inst. 10, 11.
(2) L. R. 3 H. L. 306, 318.
(3) [1903] 1 K. B. 444. [*127][
Lord Chief Justice proceeded to sum up and directed the jury as if the offence had been committed. Lynch was convicted by the jury. If the argument of the defence in the present case is right, Lynch never should have been convicted, and the Court ought to have ruled that no offence had been disclosed either by the evidence or in the indictment. The Court did not so rule, but on the contrary directed the jury upon the assumption that the offence was disclosed if the jury took a particular view of the facts.
That is a strong current of authority. I will not pass over the case in Dyer (1) to which our attention was called and upon which Mr. Sullivan placed much reliance. His argument was that on examination that case shows that there was no such offence cognizable by the common law as treason committed out of the realm; indeed he went further and argued that no such offence was known to the law at all, because no means had been found of trying the offence until the statute 35 Hen. 8, c. 2. But a consideration of the case in Dyer (1) shows that it is not a judgment at all; it is a memorandum of the judges and the King’s serjeants, some doubt having arisen as to whether a statute of 1 &2 Ph. &Mar. had repealed the statute of 35 Hen. 8, c.
Our attention was called by the learned Attorney-General to
(1) Dyer, 131b. [*128]
a series of cases of which I only propose to refer to three and to rely only upon one. First there was the case of Lord Wentworth, Grymston, and Chamberleyn. (1) The indictment there, we are told by the Attorney-General, was for an offence committed in Calais. Lord Wentworth apparently was sent to the House of Lords to be tried; Grymston was acquitted; Chamberleyn was convicted. I find it difficult to take that case as an authority. Indeed I do not think we can regard it as one because it was tried in the year 1558, and according to the indictment it seems clear that the offence was laid treating Calais as within the King’s dominions. Consequently in my judgment that case does not help us. The next case he cited was theDuke of Wharton’s Case (2), which was tried in the year 1729. There, according to the statement made from investigation of the indictment and the record, the offence was of adhering to the King’s enemies in Spain. The overt acts show the offence of adhering committed in Spain and the aid and comfort given in Spain; so that the complete offence of treason without the realm was there charged. The Duke of Wharton did not appear and was outlawed. That case assumes that by the law of England he had committed the offence. It is to be observed that the defendant did not appear and did not put his case before the Court, and therefore the case has not the full authority which would be given to a case in which the defence raised the point under discussion. The third case was that of William Cundell, tried in the year 1812, of which the record is extant, but of which there is no report except in the Newgate Calendar. (3) It was a case of adhering without the realm to the King’s enemies and giving them aid and comfort there. The case was tried. The persons were within the jurisdiction of this Court and sentence was pronounced. Therefore in the year 1812 there is distinct authority for saying that it is an offence to adhere without the realm to the King’s enemies. It was the case of persons who were confined in the Isle of France and who had there forsaken their allegiance to the King and transferred it to the French. In
(1) Unreported: Baga de Secretis, K. B. 1 Eliz., Pouch
(2) Unreported: Baga de Secretis, Trin. 2 Geo. 2, K. B. 8/67, in the Public Record Office.
(3) Vol. 4, p. 62. [*129]
view of that judgment it cannot be said that there is no authority to be found in our books for the proposition advanced by the Crown until the authority of Rex v. Lynch. (1)
I do not propose to go further through the various authorities. I have called attention to the most important of them. I come to the conclusion that the offence, if proved in fact, has been committed in law. We are merely considering now the case upon the assumption that the facts prove it. The argument of the defence is put forward on the basis that no offence is made out in law. The result of the argument upon this motion is that in my judgment the words “giving to them aid and comfort” may be read as a parenthesis; yet I do not confine the application of the words “or elsewhere” to that parenthesis; I think they apply just as much to the parenthesis as to the words which precede it. My view is, although it is not necessary to state it for the purposes of this case, that the words “or elsewhere” govern both limbs of the sentence – both the adhering to the King’s enemies and the aid and comfort to the King’s enemies – and that it is an offence to adhere within the realm or without the realm to the King’s enemies, and it is equally an offence to adhere within the realm to the King’s enemies by giving them aid and comfort without the realm.
For these reasons I am of opinion, notwithstanding the learned and able arguments that have been addressed to us, that the point fails and that the motion to quash the indictment must be refused.
AVORY J. I agree that this objection fails whether it be regarded as an objection to the indictment that it discloses no offence upon the face of it, or whether it be regarded as an objection that there is no evidence to go to the jury of an offence committed within the meaning of the statute of Edward III.
It would, in my opinion, be sufficient in this Court to say that the point which has been argued before us so strenuously and with so much learning has been already decided by this Court in Rex v. Lynch (1), but, having regard to the criticisms which have been passed upon that case, I think it right to add my own reasons for coming to the same conclusion as that which has been expressed by my Lord Chief Justice.
(1) [1903] 1 K. B. 444. [*130]
First of all, it is not right to say that the point was not in fact decided in Rex v. Lynch. (1) While it is true that no formal judgment was pronounced on the objection, it will be found by reference to the report of the case in The Times Law Reports (2) that the Lord Chief Justice stopped the Attorney-General in his reply to the argument and said that the Court was satisfied upon the point and that unless he desired to cite any further authorities they did not wish to hear him further. That was in fact a decision that the point taken was a bad one. But further, and beyond the fact, to which allusion has been made, that the prisoner in that case could not have been convicted unless the point was decided against him, it will also be found in the same report (3) that towards the close of his summing-up the learned Lord Chief Justice said “that the charge against the prisoner was that of aiding the King’s enemies; and he had already told them that the facts which had been laid before them amounted to aiding the King’s enemies, and that, wherever it was done, this was an offence in respect of which, if proved, the prisoner ought to be found guilty under the indictment.” So that there was an express direction in terms in that case to the jury that wherever the acts were done of adherence to the King’s enemies, that was an offence within the meaning of the statute.
It is also clear that the Court must interpret this statute of Edward III. in the light of the fact that it has been decided to be an Act declaratory of the common law. I cannot doubt that before the statute it was treason in a British subject to join the forces of an enemy abroad, and that if a British subject had joined the forces of an enemy abroad at war with this country, and he afterwards returned or was brought back to this country, he could be tried here for that offence. When one has regard to the nature of this offence of high treason I think it is obvious it must have been so. Foster in his Crown Law thus describes the offence of high treason (4): “High treason being an offence committed against the duty of allegiance, it may be proper …. to consider from whom, and to whom allegiance is due. With regard to natural born subjects there can be no doubt. They owe allegiance to the Crown at all times and in all places.
(1) [1903] 1 K. B. 444.
(2) 19 Times L. R. 163, 173.
(3) Ibid. 178, 179.
(4) Fost. C. L. 183. [*131]
This is what we call natural allegiance, in contradistinction to that which is local. …. Natural allegiance is founded in the relation every man standeth in to the Crown, considered as the head of that society whereof he is born a member; and on the peculiar privileges he deriveth from that relation, which are, with great propriety, called his birthright; this birthright nothing but his own demerit can deprive him of; it is indefeasible and perpetual; and consequently the duty of allegiance, which ariseth out of it, and is inseparably connected with it, is in consideration of law likewise unalienable and perpetual.” In view of that definition of the offence of high treason I think it cannot be doubted, as I have said, that such an offence committed by a British subject abroad was triable, justiciable, in this country; and the only doubts which had arisen before the statute of Henry VIII. were, as expressed by Hawkins in his Pleas of the Crown, in the passage which my Lord has already read – not a doubt whether it was triable here, not a doubt whether it was an offence committed by a British subject, but a doubt only as to the proper place and the proper manner in which it should be tried. He points out that some have held that it should be tried in one county; others that it should be tried in another county; others that it should be tried upon an indictment laying the offence in any county where the King pleased. That, no doubt, had reference to a special commission issued by the King for the trial of a particular treason, which commission would, in my opinion, get rid of all difficulty about local venue.
That being so, if this was an offence triable in this country before the statute of Edward III. – that is to say, if the offence of treason committed abroad was triable in this country before the statute of Edward III. and that statute is declaratory only of the common law – it would be a strange conclusion that the statute has limited the offence to treasons or to overt acts committed within the realm. As the Attorney-General has pointed out, the offence of adhering to the King’s enemies, giving aid and comfort to them, is an offence which is more likely, prima facie at all events, to be committed out of the realm than within it, and it would be a strange enactment to provide, if the common law was as I have said, that after this date the offence could only be committed by a person who was within the realm at the time when he committed it. [*132]
With reference to the construction of the actual words, again it would be sufficient, as my Lord has pointed out, to say that the great authorities have uniformly put upon these words the construction which the Crown invite us to give them, namely, that the statute does not limit this kind of treason to treason committed by a subject within the realm. But there appear to be two constructions of it which have been adopted, either of which will satisfy and answer this objection. It may be that the words “or elsewhere” are to be read as applying to the words “be adherent to the King’s enemies” – that is to say, if he be adherent to the King’s enemies in his realm or elsewhere; or it may be, as Serjeant Hawkins seemed to think when he said (1), “As to the second point, viz., what shall be said to be an adherence to the King’s enemies, &c., this is explained by the words subsequent, ‘giving aid and comfort to them, ’” that the proper construction of this section is that the words “giving aid and comfort to them in the realm or elsewhere” are an explanation or an exposition of the kind of adherence to the King’s enemies which is aimed at by the statute. Nobody questions that the words “or elsewhere” apply to the giving of aid and comfort to the enemy, and it may be, therefore, that the proper construction is that if a person gives aid and comfort to the King’s enemies either in the realm or elsewhere he is committing the offence of adhering to the King’s enemies within the meaning of this statute. Whichever view be taken, it is sufficient to say that all the authorities agree that it is not limited in the manner in which the learned counsel for the prisoner have invited us to confine it.
It only remains to consider in one word the statute of Henry VIII. which provides for the trial in this country of treasons committed abroad. In my view there is nothing in that statute which assists the argument for the prisoner. The recital of it is “Forasmuche as some doubtes and questions have bene moved that cten kindes of treasons, mysprisions and concealment( of treasons, done ppetrated or comytted out of the King( Majesties realme of Englande and other his Graces Dnions cannot ne maye by the comon lawes of this realme be enquired of ….” In my opinion that recital or
(1) Hawk. P. C., bk. 1, ch. 17, s. 28, vol. 1, p. 91 (Leach); ch. 2, s. 28, vol. 1, p. 12 (Curwood). [*133]
preamble of the statute rather assumes that there are already certain kinds of treason committed out of the realm which may be tried within the realm, and the probability is that the statute was only for removing doubts as to the other kinds of treason many of which had been enacted either in the reign of Henry VIII. or shortly before. At all events it makes it clear that after that date any treason committed out of the realm may be tried, as this one is being tried, by His Majesty’s judges in the King’s Bench.
For these reasons I agree that this objection must be overruled.
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LORD READING CJ La defensa ha presentado al Tribunal que esta acusación debe ser anulada por el hecho de que no revela ningún delito conocido por la ley inglesa. Otra forma de plantear la misma proposición es que
(1) 1 Este, PC 80.
(2) LR 3 HL 306, 318. [* 122]
la ventaja de argumentos elaborados, de ninguna manera demasiado elaborados, en nombre de la defensa, y también en nombre de
El argumento es que este Tribunal debe interpretar las palabras del estatuto de 1351 y no debe tener en cuenta ningún comentario que puedan haber hecho los autores eruditos, por distinguidos que sean, al llegar al significado de las palabras. Que debemos interpretar las palabras del estatuto está fuera de toda duda. Creo que no deberíamos tener derecho a violentar las palabras del estatuto, creo. Pero si las palabras del estatuto no son claras, y si es posible interpretar el estatuto de dos maneras diferentes, entonces los comentarios de los grandes abogados, maestros del derecho consuetudinario, durante los últimos tres o cuatro siglos no pueden permitirse. Corte para pasar sin la mayor consideración y consideración.
Las palabras en cuestión en el estatuto 25 Edw. 3 son estos, parafraseándolos: "Será una traición si un hombre hace la guerra contra nuestro Señor el Rey en su reino o se adhiere a los enemigos del Rey en su reino, brindándoles ayuda y consuelo en el reino o en otro lugar". El argumento es que esas palabras "u otro lugar" gobiernan solo las palabras "ayuda y consuelo en el reino" y no tienen aplicación a las palabras "adherirse a los enemigos del Rey en su reino". Como la ofensa es adherirse al Enemigos del rey, si las palabras "u otro lugar" no se aplican a la adhesión, entonces la defensa de la defensa sería correcta. Si, por otro lado, la afirmación de
(1) [1903] 1 KB 444. [* 123]
Ahora repito lo que dije durante el argumento, que debemos interpretar estas palabras de este estatuto, que ahora tiene unos 560 años, sin hacer referencia a comas o corchetes, sino simplemente al lenguaje. La historia de la ley de traición en este país es ciertamente importante al considerar el estatuto de 1351. Es innecesario en este momento, y teniendo en cuenta las autoridades a las que llamaré la atención en un momento, para referirme en gran detalle a La ley temprana. Pero no dudo en afirmar que si un hombre se adhiere a los enemigos del Rey sin el reino, está cometiendo el delito de traición; y que está cometiendo el delito de traición en el derecho consuetudinario, a pesar de que el delito se comete sin el reino. Hemos escuchado argumentos considerables para establecer que la ley común de Inglaterra nunca conoció un delito que no se cometió dentro del territorio de Inglaterra, es decir, en la antigüedad, por supuesto; y se dice que la ley común de Inglaterra todavía se obtiene, excepto en la medida en que ha sido alterada por el estatuto. Hay autoridad para la proposición que he declarado. Sir Matthew Hale en sus Súplicas de
(1) vol. 1, p. 169
(2) Fitzh. Abr. Juicio, s. 54)
(3) Ver nota (6) en la pág. 108, ante. [* 124]
pasó por que la ley común antes de este estatuto era, en mi opinión, como lo he dicho. Se ha dicho más de una vez (1) que este estatuto de 1351 era declarativo del derecho consuetudinario. No hay duda de que en ese momento había una gran agitación entre los súbditos del Rey debido al temor de la consecuencia de ser acusado de traición, que era un crimen en ese momento tan vago, o que se pensaba que era tan vago, que esos quienes podrían ser acusados de ello estaban preocupados por las consecuencias; y el resultado fue que, a petición del Parlamento, el estatuto se convirtió en ley y recibió el consentimiento del Rey en las palabras a las que me he referido.
Desde el año 1351 hasta el trigésimo quinto año del reinado de Enrique VIII. hay poco para ayudarnos; pero en el reinado de Enrique VIII. se aprobó un estatuto que, en mi opinión, es importante a este respecto. El estatuto se titula "Un Acte que concierne a la triall de traiciones traídas de los dominios de las Majestades de Kinge". Recita, nuevamente estoy parafraseando el lenguaje, que surgieron dudas y preguntas sobre el juicio de traiciones y misiones de traiciones cometidas en el extranjero. Vale la pena señalar que no habían surgido dudas sobre si el acto, si se cometía en el extranjero, equivaldría a traición, sino solo en cuanto al juicio. Luego, el estatuto procede: "Sea promulgado", & c., "Que toda clase de delitos ya sean cometidos o declarados, o en adelante hechos o declarados por cualquiera de las leyes y estatutos de este Reino, como traiciones ...". y hecho por o en el futuro o por el futuro por hacer o por cualquier persona fuera de este Reino de Englande, será consultado por el rebaño y desterrado ante el Rey (Justic (de su banco para que las peticiones se retengan ante él). "Ese es el Banco del Rey, y también como una alternativa para los comisionados donde se nombra una comisión. Ahora que el estatuto supone que el delito de traición se puede cometer sin el reino; y prescribe con respecto a todos los delitos que ya se han declarado el modo de procedimiento, o más bien el lugar del juicio. El estatuto muestra claramente que el delito existió. Desde ese momento, el estatuto ha regulado el juicio de los delitos sin el reino. Es en virtud de ese estatuto y los estatutos posteriores,
(1) 3 Inst. 1, nota; El caso de Sindercome (1657) 5 Cobb. St. Tr. 848; El caso de Bellew (1672) 1 Vent. 254, nota; Reg. v. Smith O'Brien (1849)
que realmente no han hecho más que estipular que los condados de Londres y Middlesex serán un condado para este propósito, que se deriva la jurisdicción de este Tribunal. Debido a que estamos sentados como jueces del King's Bench, nos convertimos en jueces para juzgar este caso, por la razón de que, si es una traición cometida sin el reino, el estatuto de Enrique VIII prescribe el lugar. a partir de los jueces del rey "donde el sagrado Benche se unirá y será kepte". Ese estatuto de Enrique VIII. al menos muestra claramente cuál era la ley en el momento en que se aprobó, y es, en mi opinión, la autoridad para esta proposición, que existía el delito de traición sin el reino; y además, de manera bastante consistente con la lectura que
(1) Halcón. PC, bk. 2, cap. 25, s. 48, vol. 4, p. 22 (lixiviación); vol. 2, p. 306 (Curwood). [* 126]
del gran maestro de la ley y también de Sir Matthew Hale, a quien acabo de citar. La única observación que deseo hacer es que la defensa diría, como señaló el Sr. Sullivan, y, creo, con razón, que no se sigue que este significado deba darse a las palabras que se están discutiendo porque, Se dice que hubo otros delitos de traición sin el reino. Pero igualmente debe observarse que el autor erudito no sugiere ninguna excepción a la declaración general, y no hay nada que respalde una excepción, salvo la interpretación del estatuto solicitado por la defensa. No puedo encontrar ninguna justificación para dudar de que estos autores eruditos quisieran que su lenguaje se aplicara igualmente a un caso de adhesión a los enemigos del Rey sin el reino como a cualquier otro tipo de delito de traición sin el reino.
Ahora no volveré a leer los pasajes en los Institutos de Coca-Cola, pero contienen (1) una declaración de la ley que es clara en sus términos y que el Sr. Sullivan declaró francamente que era una autoridad en su contra, si el Tribunal lo aceptaba como un autoridad.
Luego, llegando a días posteriores, hay pasajes en Mulcahy v. Reg . (2) en el que Willes J., al dar a
Luego, por fin llegamos a la decisión en Rex v. Lynch . (3) Allí el mismo argumento fue presentado por la defensa que se presentó ante nosotros, y fue persistido y discutido elaboradamente. El Tribunal llegó a la conclusión de que la afirmación del acusado era incorrecta y, aunque no dictó sentencia, el entonces
(1) 3 Inst. 10, 11.
(2) LR 3 HL 306, 318.
(3) [1903] 1 KB 444. [* 127] [
Lord Chief Justice procedió a resumir y dirigió al jurado como si el delito hubiera sido cometido. Lynch fue condenado por el jurado. Si el argumento de la defensa en el presente caso es correcto, Lynch nunca debería haber sido condenado, y
Esa es una fuerte corriente de autoridad. No pasaré por alto el caso en Dyer (1) en el que se llamó nuestra atención y en el que el Sr. Sullivan confió mucho. Su argumento fue que, al examinarlo, ese caso muestra que no existía un delito tan reconocible por el derecho común como la traición cometida fuera del reino; de hecho, fue más allá y argumentó que la ley no conocía tal delito, porque no se había encontrado ningún medio para juzgar el delito hasta el estatuto 35 Hen. 8, c. 2. Pero una consideración del caso en Dyer (1) muestra que no es un juicio en absoluto; Es un memorándum de los jueces y los sargentos del Rey, algunos han surgido dudas sobre si un estatuto de 1 y 2 Ph. y Mar. había derogado el estatuto de 35 gallinas.8, c. 2, en la medida en que ese estatuto declara que las traiciones sin el reino deben ser juzgadas por los jueces del Banco del Rey. En el resultado llegaron a la conclusión de que el estatuto de Enrique VIII. No fue derogado. La confianza se colocó ante nosotros sobre las palabras "porque ningún delito de traición cometido fuera del reino era confiable aquí por el curso del derecho común". El comentario obvio es que las palabras suponían que había un delito de traición cometido fuera del reino. . La dificultad era que no se sabía cómo era confiable por el curso del derecho consuetudinario. Todo lo que hicieron los jueces y el Maestro de los Rolls allí reunidos fue declarar el efecto de este estatuto 1 y 2 Ph. Y Mar. La cuestión que se ha planteado ante nosotros no se planteó. Por el contrario, se suponía que existía un delito como la traición sin el reino. La dificultad, que se encuentra a través de siglos de nuestra ley, es en cuanto al procedimiento cuando hubo traición sin el reino, es decir, en cuanto al lugar del juicio.
El sabio Fiscal General llamó nuestra atención para
(1) Dyer, 131b. [* 128]
una serie de casos de los cuales solo propongo referirme a tres y confiar solo en uno. Primero estaba el caso de Lord Wentworth, Grymston y Chamberleyn . (1) La acusación allí, según nos informa el Fiscal General, fue por un delito cometido en Calais. Lord Wentworth aparentemente fue enviado a
(1) No reportado: Baga de Secretis, KB 1 Eliz., Pouch 38, en
(2) Sin informar: Baga de Secretis, Trin. 2 geo. 2, KB 8/67, en
(3) vol. 4, p. 62. [* 129]
En vista de ese juicio, no se puede decir que no hay autoridad en nuestros libros para la propuesta presentada por
No propongo ir más allá a través de las diversas autoridades. He llamado la atención sobre los más importantes. Llego a la conclusión de que el delito, si se demuestra de hecho, ha sido cometido por ley. Simplemente estamos considerando ahora el caso asumiendo que los hechos lo prueban. El argumento de la defensa se presenta sobre la base de que la ley no establece ningún delito. El resultado del argumento sobre esta moción es que, a mi juicio, las palabras "darles ayuda y consuelo" pueden leerse como un paréntesis; sin embargo, no limito la aplicación de las palabras "o en otro lugar" a ese paréntesis; Creo que se aplican tanto al paréntesis como a las palabras que lo preceden. Mi opinión es, aunque no es necesario declararlo a los efectos de este caso, que las palabras "u otro lugar" rigen ambos miembros de la oración, tanto la adhesión a los enemigos del Rey como la ayuda y consuelo a los enemigos del Rey. y que es una ofensa adherirse dentro del reino o sin él a los enemigos del Rey, y es igualmente una ofensa adherirse dentro del reino a los enemigos del Rey dándoles ayuda y consuelo sin el reino.
Por estas razones, opino, a pesar de los argumentos aprendidos y capaces que nos han sido presentados, que el punto falla y que la moción para anular la acusación debe ser rechazada.
AVORY J. Estoy de acuerdo en que esta objeción falla, ya sea que se considere como una objeción a la acusación de que no revela ningún delito a primera vista, o si se considera como una objeción de que no hay evidencia para ir al jurado de un delito cometido en el sentido del estatuto de Eduardo III.
En mi opinión, sería suficiente en este Tribunal decir que el punto que se ha argumentado ante nosotros tan enérgicamente y con tanto conocimiento ya ha sido decidido por este Tribunal en Rex v. Lynch (1), pero, teniendo en cuenta A las críticas que se han transmitido sobre ese caso, creo que es correcto agregar mis propias razones para llegar a la misma conclusión que la expresada por mi Lord Presidente del Tribunal Supremo.
(1) [1903] 1 KB 444. [* 130]
En primer lugar, no es correcto decir que el punto no se decidió de hecho en Rex v. Lynch . (1) Si bien es cierto que no se pronunció un juicio formal sobre la objeción, se hará referencia al informe del caso en The Times Law Reports (2) que el Lord Chief Justice detuvo al Fiscal General en su respuesta al argumento y dijo que
También está claro que
(1) [1903] 1 KB 444.
(2) 19 veces LR 163, 173.
(3) Ibíd. 178, 179.
(4) Fost. CL 183. [* 131]
Esto es lo que llamamos lealtad natural, en contraste con lo que es local. ... La lealtad natural se funda en la relación que cada hombre mantiene con
Siendo así, si esto fuera un delito verificable en este país antes del estatuto de Eduardo III. - es decir, si el delito de traición cometido en el extranjero era juzgable en este país antes del estatuto de Eduardo III. y ese estatuto es declarativo solo del derecho consuetudinario; sería una conclusión extraña que el estatuto ha limitado el delito a traiciones o actos públicos cometidos dentro del reino. Como ha señalado el Fiscal General, el delito de adherirse a los enemigos del Rey, brindarles ayuda y consuelo, es un delito que es más probable, prima facie en todo caso, que se cometa fuera del reino que dentro de él. y sería una promulgación extraña establecer, si el derecho consuetudinario es como he dicho, que después de esta fecha el delito solo podría ser cometido por una persona que se encontraba dentro del reino en el momento en que lo cometió. [* 132]
Con referencia a la construcción de las palabras reales, nuevamente sería suficiente, como lo señaló mi Señor, decir que las grandes autoridades han puesto uniformemente sobre estas palabras la construcción que
Solo queda considerar en una palabra el estatuto de Enrique VIII. que prevé el juicio en este país de traiciones cometidas en el extranjero. En mi opinión, no hay nada en ese estatuto que sirva de argumento para el prisionero. El recital es "Porque muchas dudas y preguntas se han beneficiado de que algunos tipos de traiciones, mysprisions y ocultamiento (de traiciones, hechas o extraídas del Rey) (Majestades, el reino de Englande y otras Graces Dnions no pueden ne se preguntará a los comon lawes de este reino ... "En mi opinión, ese considerando o
(1) Halcón. PC, bk. 1, cap. 17, s. 28, vol. 1, p. 91 (lixiviación); ch. 2, s. 28, vol. 1, p. 12 (Curwood). [* 133]
El preámbulo del estatuto más bien supone que ya hay ciertos tipos de traición cometidos fuera del reino que pueden ser juzgados dentro del reino, y la probabilidad es que el estatuto fue solo para eliminar dudas sobre los otros tipos de traición, muchos de los cuales tenían se promulgó en el reinado de Enrique VIII. o poco antes En cualquier caso, deja en claro que después de esa fecha, cualquier traición cometida fuera del reino puede ser juzgada, como esta está siendo juzgada, por los jueces de Su Majestad en el Banco del Rey.
Por estas razones, estoy de acuerdo en que esta objeción debe ser anulada.
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